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Constitutional Law-1961 Tennessee Survey (II)
fames C. Kirby, Jr.*
I. EQUAL PROTECTION-RACIAL

DISCRIMNATION

II. HomE RuLE-SIF-ExEcuTmG CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
III. MISCELLANEOUS
Only three cases are assigned to this field for the abbreviated survey
period and in one of these, the court avoided the constitutional question.
In the other two cases the constitutional issues were not difficult and the
results reached should cause neither surprise nor controversy among survey
readers.
I. EQUAL PROTEcnON-AcAL DISCRIMINATION
Turner v. Randolph1 is another step in the slow but steady elimination
of racial discrimination in governmental facilities and services. Negro
residents sued to compel desegregation of the public libraries of Memphis
and Shelby County. The defendants agreed as to all library facilities
except washrooms, lavatories and toilets and pleaded as their defense a
city ordinance which required separate washroom facilities for white
and black races in all buildings used by the public. The United States
district court held the ordinance unconstitutional as applied to public
libraries and ordered desegregation of these facilities along with all other
facilities of the libraries. Restrooms, lavatories and toilet facilities were
found by the court to be "essential in the proper operation of the library
units themselves." It was unnecessary for the court to consider whether
the ordinance could be applied constitutionally to other types of buildings
and it limited its decision to the particular facilities involved.
This decision should come as no surprise to those who have followed
the course of desegregation decisions since the public schools decision in
Brown v. Board of Education overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine.3
*Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee; Chief Counsel, Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, United States Senate, Washington, D.C.
1. 195 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Tenn. 1961).
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. The opinion in the present case relied in part upon McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950), which was decided before the separate-but-equal
doctrine was overruled; it held that classroom, library and cafeteria segregation of a
single Negro graduate student in a state university denied him equal protection of
the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment. However, it is difficult to see

how separate toilet facilities could handicap Negroes in their, use of Memphis' library
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The Turner case's holding as to toilet facilities follows a virtually unbroken
line of federal decisions dealing with all types of publicly operated facilities
including recreational parks, 4 golf courses, 5 swimming pools, 6 restaurants,1
and employment services. 8 It should be apparent to all by now that no
governmental facility or service may be operated except upon the basis of
equal availability to all members of the public without discrimination in
any form on account of color or race.
The defendants attempted to support the ordinance as an exercise of
the police power by offering proof tending to show a high incidence of
venereal disease among Negroes and the possibility of such diseases being
communicated through toilet facilities. The court considered this evidence
but rejected it with the statement that "no scientific or reliable data have
been offered to demonstrate that the joint use of toilet facilities by the
races .. would constitute a serious danger to the public health, safety or
welfare."9
This finding may suggest to some that a contrary holding might have
been reached if stronger proof were made on these factual contentions.
It is doubtful that a factual defense of this type can ever be used successfully to defend racial segregation. Even if the alleged factual justification were established, the result of the segregation would be to bar
any member of one race from using the particular public facility assigned
to the opposite race regardless of his individual condition of health. By
the same token, it would admit all members of the opposite race regardless
of health. An undiseased Negro would be compelled to use a toilet
which presumably is a greater danger to his health than that used by a
white person in the same condition of health. This discrimination would
result solely because of their differences in race and it would thus deny
the Negro equal protection of the laws as that guarantee is currently
applied.
facilities in the same way that segregating the Oklahoma student handicapped his
pursuit of effective graduate instruction.
4. City of Montgomery v. Gilmore, 277 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960); Department of
Conservation & Development v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1960); Dawson v.
Mayor & City Council, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 350 U.S. 877 (1955);
Shuttlesworth v. Gaylord, 6 RAcE REL_.L. REP. 1101, (N.D. Ala. 1961).
5. City of Greensboro v. Simkins, 246 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1957); Ward v. City of
Miami, 151 F. Supp. 593 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
6. City of St. Petersburg v. Alsup, 238 F.2d 830 (5th Cr. 1956).
7. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Derrington v.
Plummer, 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956); Brooks v. City of Tallahassee, 6 RAcE Rr..
L. REP. 1099 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
8. Pryor v. Poirier, 6 RACE REL. L. REP. 1098 (D. Kan. 1961).
9. 195 F. Supp. at 680.
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II. Hocm

RuLE-SmL-ExEcuTiNG CONSTTrrUONAL PROVISIONS

A section of the home rule amendments to the Tennessee constitution

0

was construed to be self-executing in Washington County Election Comsn'n
v. City of Johnson City.11 Three separate methods are provided for proposing amendments to the charter of a home rule city: (1) by ordinance
of the city's legislative body, (2) by a charter commission elected as
provided by act of the General Assembly, or (3) in the absence of such
legislation, by a seven-member charter commission elected pursuant to
a petition signed by 10%of the voters of the city. Since the legislature
had not provided an applicable procedure for the election of a charter
commission, the voters of Johnson City followed the third route and
petitioned the county election commission to conduct a municipal election
of a charter commission. In an equity proceeding between the city and
the election commission, the city sought to enjoin election of a commission pursuant to the petition alleging that the pertinent constitutional

provisions were ineffective without implementing legislation. In a decision
clearly dictated by the language of the constitution12 and the history of
these provisions,' 3 the supreme court affirmed the chancellor and held the
provisions to be self-executing, thus allowing election of the charter commission to proceed.
The principal problem faced by the court was whether the constitutional

language was sufficiently detailed to create rights enforceable by the
courts. Although the question is primarily one of intent and a provision of

a constitution as detailed and code-like as Tennessee's should be presumed to be self-executing,14 a constitutional provision can be self-execut10. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 9. For a general discussion of these amendments and
their background, see Hunt, Constitutional Law-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VArND. L.
REv. 763 (1954).
11. 350 S.W.2d 601 (Tenn. 1961).
12. "A charter or amendment may be proposed by ordinance of any home rule
municipality, by a charter commission provided for by Act of the General Assembly
and elected by the qualified voters of a home rule municipality voting thereon or,
in the absence of such act of the General Assembly, by a charter commission of
seven (7) members, chosen at large not more often than once in two (2) years,
in a municipal election pursuant to petition for such election signed by qualified
voters of a home rule municipality not less in number than ten (10%) per cent of
those voting in the then most recent general municipal election." T.NN. CONST. art.
XI, § 9. It is evident that the second method of amendment is to be pursuant to
enabling legislation and that the third is intended for the situation where the legislature fails to provide a statutory procedure, clearly contemplating its availability
although the legislature has not acted.
13. The court relied upon the fact that in the 1953 Constitutional Convention
these provisions were explained on the floor as being intended "to make it unnecessary
to have the workability of the plan implemented by legislation . . . to make it selfexecuting, so that the legislature would not have to pass an enabling act." 350
S.W.2d at 604.
14. Early state constitutions and the federal constitution were generally only outlines of government which sought only to establish governmental machinery and
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ing "only so far as it is susceptible of execution."' 5 An issue in the Johnson
City case was whether the provision in question was too general and incomplete to be capable of self-execution. If held to be self-executing,
the city asked the court to construe it and determine such questions as
the terms, qualifications and compensation of commission members. The
court found none of these omissions to be fatal, filled some by interpretation and held that other details could be filled in by act of the city's
legislative body.
The lohnson City decision is both sound as a matter of constitutional
interpretation and wholesome for the implementation of municipal home
rule in Tennessee. If the provision for popular initiation of charter
amendments had not been held to be self-executing, it would have enabled
inaction of the legislature to defeat the intended rights of city voters to
institute amendatory procedures. 16

III. MIscELLANEous

In State ex rel. Lewis v. Tennessee,17 the court avoided a constitutional
decision by finding the question to be moot. Lewis was arrested and
confined for public drunkenness upon a warrant of arrest and mittimus
issued by a deputy clerk of a general sessions court. A petition for habeas
corpus was filed alleging unconstitutionality of the law authorizing clerks
of general sessions courts to issue warrants and other process.' 8 The trial
judge denied the petition and Lewis appealed. In the meantime, the grand
jury returned a no true bill and Lewis was released. Since the relator was
no longer in custody, the habeas corpus petition on his behalf had become
secure certain fundamental rights to the people; their provisions were not generally
presumed to be self-executing. Most modem state constitutions are detailed codes
which are intended to operate directly upon the people in the same manner as statutes,
and their provisions are generally presumed to be self-executing. 11 A. Jun. Constitutional Law § 72 (1937).
15. Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 403 (1900).
16. A principal reason that constitutions are generally presumed to be self-executing
is that any other construction would enable legislatures to nullify provisions merely
by failure to enact implementing legislation. "[A] constitutional provision should
never be construed as dependent for its eflficacy and operation upon legislative will....
So that when the provision of a Constitution .. .forbids damage to private property,
and points out no remedy, and no statute affords one, for the invasion of the right of
property thus secured, the provision is self-executing, and the common law, which
provides a remedy for every wrong, will furnish the appropriate action for the redress
of the grievance." Swift & Co. v. City of Newport News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S.E. 821,
824 (1906). By the same token, the legislature cannot defeat constitutional rights
created by self-executing provisions by enacting conflicting legislation or creating
remedies inadequate to protect the right. Way v. Barney, 116 Minn. 285, 133 N.W.
801 (1911).
17. 347 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1961).
18. TmNN. CODE ANN. § 18410 (Supp. 1961).
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moot.19 It was therefore unnecessary to decide the constitutional question
and the appeal was dismissed.
19. Upon appeal from a denial of the writ of habeas corpus, where the relator is
no longer in custody by reason of acquittal, expiration of sentence or otherwise, the
appeal generally will be dismissed, since the sole object of the writ is to test the
lawfulness of the confinement and obtain release of the prisoner. Weber v. Squier, 315
U.S. 810 (1942); United States v. Brilliant, 274 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1960); Witte v.
Ferber, 219 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1955); 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 118 (1944).

